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German banks are often criticized, or praised,  This stresses the role of the supervisory
depending on a person's viewpoint, for owning  board as a negotiating forum for' all interested
German industry and for playing an active part in  parties. It leaves little room for the interpretation
corporate control.  that the bankers are exclusively in contro.9.
Harm argues that this misrepresents German  Fourth, bank ownership of industry is not
banking. First, the number of German firns  a  pervasive, but is in fact limited to a few special
bank can own or control, although significant, is  cases. Ownership of significant stakes has
limited.  further decreased during the last decade.
Some very large firns  are predominantly  Fifth, proxy voting is more important thar,
private.ly  owned, or are not chartered as joint-  stock ownership as a potential means of control.
stock companies that could potentiaUy be listed  Harm notes that it is generally agreed in Ger-
on an exchange. Most small firms, and even  many that banks provide a useful service to smal
some large firms, do not even have a supervisory  shareholders. Although more than half of the
board - which is the most important forum  largest 100 finns are not affected by proxy
through which bankers can represent their  voting, the continued attractiveness of corporate
interests in a firm.  equities for the general public suggests that the
control issues associated with proxy voting will
Second, although most of the largest 100  become increasingly important.
firms have a bank member on their supervisory
board, this does not imply effective bank control.  Harm argues that the German s-stem of
Many companies have two bankers from differ-  corporate govemance represents an efficient
ent institutions on their board.  attempt to minimize socially wasteful behavior.
The negotiated consensus achieved in the
Third, the role of the banker in the supervi-  boardroom provides better incentives to manage-
sory board has to be viewed in the light of the  ment to maximize firm value and social welfare
rigorous standards of corporate govemance  than the factionalized U.S. system.
imposed on German public firms. The
Codetermination Law of 1976 mandates that
labor be represented on the supervisory board of
the largest firms as well as all joint-stock compa-
ries.
The  Policy  Research  Working  PaperSeriesdisseminates  thcfEdingsofworkunder  way  in  therank. Anobjectiveofthe  series
is to get these  findings  out quickly,  even if presentationls  are less than fully polished.  'Me findings,  interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  of  ficial Bank  policy.
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The task  set out for this reserch is to give the reader a comprehensive  overview  of
the institutional  structure  of the German  baning system  in its role to finance  large German
firms. To some  extent,  this paper  is a response  to a sfill  prevaLling  myth  in the Anglo-Saxon
literature:  that German  banks  own  or control  German  :ndustry.
The size structure and the structure with respect to legal incorporation  lza e already
been shown by Harm [18J  to limit  the scale and scope of ownership and control oy German
banks.  The  discussion  of the governance  bodies as defined by law will show that the extent
of control  that comes  with a Board  seat  is more  limited  and different  in nature  than for
example  in the USA. We  will see that the role of banks  in corporate  control  - although
partially  rooted  in history  - is also  due to the legal  environment.  but most  importantly  can
carry economic  efficiency  properties  due to the closeness  of the concepts  of monitoing  and
control.
Chapter  two will be more  analytical,  showing  the difficulty  to exactly  separate  the two
issues  of monitoring  as a pure information  gathering  activity,  and control  as decision-taking,
with  consulting  activities  bridging  the two concepts. We intend  to show  that the two issues
are difficult  to separate,  comparing  the monitoring  functions  of banks  to that of internal
auditing  departnents,  external  auditors,  and Boards  of directors. The  comparison  of Board
structures  in Gennany  and the USA  is to provide  more  insights  as to why bankers  would  be
more  likely  to hold Board  mandates  in Germany,  but not in the United  States.
Chapter ree  will  discuss  the relationship  of the large  German  banks  with large
industry.  Factual  information,  as far as pubDlicly  available,  will be provided  on the extent  of
bank  ownership  of large firms, the extent  of the banks' use of proxy  votes, and the extent  of
Board  mandates  held by bankers. This wi'l be analyzed  in Obe  context  of what  had been  said
in chapter  two about  control  associated  wiih debt  claims. The analysis  will not be able to
conclude  that German  banks  abuse  their  power  to the detr:ment  of any other stakeholder  in
the firm, and it is not even  clear whether  the bank  has strong  incentives  to do so.
12.  The thn  linfe  between monitoring and control:
from Information gathering to decsion-taking
The system of planined  economies  has presumably  failed, because the centalized
institutions  cannot overcome the information  problem.  They have insufficient means of
assessing  the demand for existing products, or of deciding the direction of R&D investments
to meet the demand for product innovation. If we have learnt anything from recent history,
then it is that the decentralized  planning  system, where information  is exchanged via the
price system, is infinitely  more efficier. in meeting the demands of the economic units in a
society.  Yet, the banking system, when viewea as a unit, has a task not unlike that of a
centra! planner.  A bank that operates nationwide  has to decide on the profitability  of
investments  across virtually all industries. We would like to show here how the German
banks handle the information  problem.
2.1.  Debt claims as s4tisfi-ing instruments
Before we descend to the reality of information  gathering, a few general remarks on
the demand for information  seem appropriate. Recently, the theory of transaction  cost
economics  has also made its way into the theory of finance.'  As regards the choice between
debt and equity investments,  transactions  costs economics  argues that debt claims are
satisficing  instruments  in the sense of Herbert Simon's [41] concept  of bounded rationality:
they yield a satisfactory  return to the investor, thereby also limiting his demand for
information.
The choice between debt and equity investments  is contingent  on the information
processing  capabilities  of the investor.  The well informed  investor will choose equity, and
invest substantially  in information  gathering to participate in the decision-maldng  process,
while the uninformed  investor chooses debt, as he has no means to process the information
on the investment  project efficiently  enough to meaningfully  influence (or take) management
decisioi  -.-  Viewed  in this light, it is no coincidence  that the banking systems around the
world, v  :h all face the problems of information  gathering in a centrlized  institution,
invest the& funds as debt claims - satisficing  instruments  - to limit the amount of information
necessary for efficient investment  decisions. 3 This is likely to be the single most important
feature of a rather centralized  system of investment  institutions  like a banking system.  The
following  sections are me-nt to explain how German banks institutionalize  meeting their
demand for information  on their clients and what their means of control are.
'Williamson [45]
2See Hax [(1i] and Harm [2Q1  for this interpretation  of the evolution of the structure of
financial  claims.
3This was a core argument against the implementation  of an Islamic banking system
(Harm [19]).
22.2.  Information from clients' accounts and balance sheet data
Processing accounting  data of the clieftt firms is the bread and butter of the banldng
business in every country, and the German banking system is not different in that respect.
Accounting  data are the typical means by which a centralistic  institution  tries to orvercome  the
information  processing  problem referred to aoove.  As it is impossibit for a cenuralized
agency to gather and process data on the individual  decisions  facing the decentmlized units
one tries to develop summary  statistics that make the most different individual cases
comparable. As every bank client has to submit a balance sheet, and displays a certain
behavior  towards the bank with the handling  of lines of credit, these items are the natural
sources of bank information.
Balance sheet data inherently  have a more long-term information  content than the
handling  of clients' aecounts, as they ultimately  provide meaningful  information  on a single
client only in comparison  across -!ears. Balance sheet data can only provide information  in
long-term trends, while information  from clients' accounts is more rudimentary, but also
m,h  more timely, and can trigger immediate  action.
The accounting data available  to the banks are pooled within the banks, a&kd  structured
with respect to industry, size and legal form of incorporation. First, the information  is
processed in regional and national headquarters  to provide the decision-makers  there with
summary statistics  on the multitude  of clients nandled by the branches.  Then, the pooled
statistics flow back to the branches for the assessment  of individual  clients in a cross-section
of related firms.
Recently, Meyer [31] has come up with a detailed study on the different modes of
analyzing  accounting  data in various banks oi groups of banks.  His findings are especially
interesting when we examine the roles of the different kinds of banks with respect to their
market niches as described  above.  We have already stated, 4 how the legally independent
Sparkassen  and cooperative  banks have created systems of internal capital markets to help
each other.  This is no different in the case of analyzing  accounting data.
Savings banks and credit cooperatives  have centralized their respective systems to
process accounting  data from the client firms so that each member bank processes its data on
a particular client according to a standard format.  The study by Meyer [31] also revealed
that the savings banks take a leading role in the banking  industry with their state of the art of
data analysis, and that also the information  processing  system of the credit cooperatives is
extremely refined compared to other banks.  We want to offer three potential explanations
for this phenomenon.
First and probably foremost stands the fact that small banks have few meaps to
diversify.  They are virtually by definition  limited to a particular region, and are thus more
vulnerable  to regional shocks than large banks.  As regions also have typical industries, this
4See Harm [t8]
3results also in an unhedgeable  position with respect to industry.  Furthermore, we have
shown in Harm [18] that small banks are also more exposed to small firms.  All these factors
lead to a significantly  larger bank specific  risk stemming  just from the fate of being small.
This disadvantage  compared to the larger banks can obvio;zsly  lead to a larger demand for
information  to assess the individual  risk, as it is covered to a lesser extent through portfolio
diversification.
Secondly, the large banks also translate the pooled information  of accounting data into
exposure  policies with respect to branches or other charactexnstics  so that the use of the
pooled d%ta  for cross-sectional  comparison  with an individual firm may not be viewed as
important, and the data needed for exposure policies need not be as detailed as if they were
used for credit analysis.  The absence of systemic  exposure guidelines  in the case of the
Sparkassen  and cooperative  banks coupled with the more client oriented information
gathering mechanisms  may actually turn out to be an advantage for the small banks.
No firm can unambigously  be assigned to any one industry, and a limit on industry
exposure  can effectively hinder a branch of a large bank from making a loan to a
creditworthy  client - a typical example of resource misallocation  due to the limits of
information  processing  in a centralized institution. It is likely that the Sparkassen  and
cooperative  banks make good on their diversification  disadvantage  by not being exposed to
industry limits and instead spending more energy on gathering information  on individual
risks.
Viewing bank size and the structure of the different banking groups' clienteles as
external variables, the a'uove  analysis suggests that large and small banks have structured the
gathering  and use of information  optimally  depending on their situation.  Whether the size of
the average client also determines the size of the lending bank is subject to speculation. Why
should the branch manager of a small branch in a big bank be in a better or worse position to
lend efficiently  to small businesses?  He might be at a disadvantage, if exposure limits lead to
higher misallocations  of resources in the case oI lending to small firms as opposed to large
firms, but that is still an unsettled issue.
One last reason, probably the most speculative,  of explaining  the observed differences
in information  gathering policy is that the smaller banks have a clientele of firms that are
often owner-managed,  with less potential  influence  of the banker on the owner-manager  as in
the case of an employed manager, who may be more prone to accept the banker's authority,
especially if the banker is a member  of his firm's Board.
2.3.  Direct and indirect consulting activities
Accounting  data have above been identified as the most basic pieces of information
that a bank can base its financing decisions  on.  As a bank needs to economize on the costs
of information  acquisition and has to cover the entire spectrum of firms in the real sectc,  the
general level of analysis cannot go beyond summary statistics. .However,  there are a number
of instances, where the bank has to go beyond that level of analysis in order to assess the
4clients' creditworthiness. In these instances, the distinction  between information  acquisition
and information  provision (consulting)  begins to blur.'
Unlike an equity investor.,  a bank is not interested  in the impact of a manager's
marginal decision on the firm's profitability,  but it nevertheless is interested in the irmpact  on
the firm's probability of barJcuptcy.  Ihe more likely bankruptcy  becomes, the larger the
incettives of a bank to influence  management. This may happen when balance sheet data
poin,t  at a iaegadive  trend, but in Harm  118]  we also discussd  the importance  of consulting
and advisory services above in the case of business start-ups, because the probability of
failure is larger for new enterprises.
Consulting is a word used with varying definitions,  and we use it here in the broadest
sense.  Any salesman  of a product is typically  more of an expert regarding his product than
his client.  In case he would not only sell the product, but -also  recommend  the optimal use of
it, he would in this sense perform a consulting activity, as he not only sells a product, but
also information.
P:'kel  (4] discussed a long list of consulting  activities of banks, and financial  advisory
services are naturally on top of the list, as they are directly related to the banks' product.
Consulting  is never only providing information,  but it is necessarily  preceded by acquiring
information  on the respective  problem in order to yield an analysis that helps the
management  of the firm.  Thus, when a bank should decide that a particular client demands
more investigation  for example in his financial  planning, ihey may actually provide a
consulting service to him after they find out about the state of financial  planning in the
respective firm.
Bickel (4] argued that such kinds of consulting  services provided by banks are
especially  prominent in their relationships  with small firms, because the bank has many
services to offer particularly  to small firms.  Bank  staff typically  has a business oriented
training, while the managers  of small firms typically  started their business or got to their
position in the firm, because they were experts in their product's market. 6 This is also an
experience that was mentioned  by virtually every banker that was interviewed  in the course
of this project: the critical phase in any business is when it grows to a size that the manager
becomes more and more involved  in administration,  representation,  and planning, and gets
more disattached  from the product.  In this situation, the bank can assist its clients,
ultimately  for its own good.
5 In this context, a quote by Alfred Herrhausen [22,p. 103]: "The control institutions  of the
corporations  became  consulting  institutions,  because  the important  feature of a control institution
is not to uncover mistakes made in the past, but to prevent mistakes from being made." (Free
translation)  This corresponds to the changing  role of internal auditing  departments  as voiced  by
Puchta [40,p.65].
6Bickel  [4,p.202]
5Typically, the next important  activity after financial  advisory services (translating
investment  plans into financial  plans) is the scrutiny of a firm's infonnation system, as this is
part of the bank's know-how. Another obvious area is the financial  part of mergers and
acquisitions. When the bank's own expertise reaches its limits, the usual step is to call in an
auditing or consultiung  firm, always provide  J the managemes.  agrees to such measures. 7 Thne
move o; banks to have their own consultini,  firms is a very recent move in Germany, and has
litde to do with the historic perfumrance  of the German banking system, but I was also
surprised to leam that orne  large bank had oily two years ago institutionalized  meeting the
demand for consulting  and advisory services by creating a separate division only for that
t,ak.8
The answer lies in the traditional  procedure to employ outside agents for the
consulting and analyzing  activity.  Every banker interviewed  was ready to admit that in the
bank there was certainly no expertise on the individual  product markets, and with all that has
been said above, this cannot be efficient, as it would  be analogous to a planned economy.
Also today, product related topics are not part of bank consulting, but we meant to have
shown in this section that more detailed analyses of client firms, triggered by signals from
accounting data, often end up to be indistinguishable  from copsulting  activities.  Again, this
feature is especially  important in the lending activities  of German banks to firms in the
Mittelstand.
2.4.  Banks'  involvement in the Boards of client frums:  a US - German comparison
'While  consulting  and advisory activities  are a control device of intermediate  intensity,
as they show features of both information  acquisition as well as information  provision to
improve the quality of decisions, banks can also send members to the Boards of client firms
with the result of greater possibilities  to actively influence the decision-making  process in the
firm's management. This is the ever lively debate on the power of German banks. 9 We do
not intend to diminish the potential  power that German  bankers hold in large firms through
the companies' Supervisory  Boards (Aufsichtsrate),  but a number of qualifiers are necessary
to assess the true dimension of the scope of influence  by the banks.
The first qualifier to be inserted has already been provided in Harm [18].  It was
shown there that the share of AG's in the domestic revenues accounted  for approximately
21%.  The AG is the only corporate form that is legally required to have an Aufsichtsrat
71t  should  be clear that in a situation  of financial  distress, which triggered  the bank's demand
for more information  in the first place, the bank has a lot of leverage to force such a measure
on the manager of the firm.
'One employee  there stressed the notion that it was a move by his bank away from collateral
and towards creditworthiness  lending. That this happened  only two years ago shows something
about the nature of the banking industry.
9See  for example  Greiffenberg  [16], Herrhausen  [22], Huffschmid  [24], Der Spiegel [10,12],
and Industriemagazin  [26].
6(Board of Directors).  For the GmbH  and the Personengesellschaften  with less than 2000
emp'oyees, the formation  of an institution  to represent shareholder  interests with respect to
management  is optional, and is called "Beirat".  The Beirat is an informal institution, whose
charter is defined in the company's statutes.  Firms with more than 2000 emplyees have to
have a Board for labour representation.
It is therefore important to differentiate  between shareholder  representation  in the AG
and other corporate forms, mostly GmbH's.  Gaugler and Heimburger  [141  conducted  a
survey which showed  that bankers  are not often present in the Beirite of the firms in the
Mittelstand  so that our attention here is focussing  on the Boards  of the AG's and other large
firms that are required to have a Board.
Moreover, it is very important  to distingLish  between the German Aufsichtsrat  and the
American  Board of Directors.  Although  the two institution serve the same purpose, they
nevertheless  have significantly  different strur.*ures. A comparison  of the two structures has
been provided by a detailed investigation  by Bleicher, Leberl and Paul t5].10 Probably the
most important  difference they pointed at is that German corporations  -*--overned  by two
legally separate  bodies, the Vorstand, which is responsible for the day-to-day management,
and the Aufsichtsrat, which is responsible  for the supeivision of the Vorstand.  In the US,
there exists a distinction  of inside and outside Board members, which are nevertheless  part of
the same body.
The important difference  is that the authority of the Aufsichtsrat  is limited, while the
outside Board members  have the same authority as the inside Board members.  This leads to
the effec-t  that, however influential  a German Board member may have been in pushing a
decision, he is usually not legally liable for a managerial  decision.  An American outside
Board member, however, is liable for management  decisions to the extent that the "Duty of
Care" principle can be applied against him.
That the German Aufsichtsrat  is absolved from the consequences  of actual manage-
ment is an impoitant consideration  when examining  the role of German bankers in their
client firms' Boards.  Prowse [37], in an empirical study on the impact of close relations
between Japanese banks and their clients argued that the threat of "equitable subordination"
was a major deterrent for banks in the US trying to assume a more active role in the
managements  of ailing clients. He was arguing that the absence of such a legal threat in
Japan fostered Japanese banks' close relationships  with their clients.  We are making the
same case here for Germany.
The separation  of management  and Board is most certainly due to a belief that a
management  should  not be in a position to control itself, which has always been a concern in
the American system, resulting in several changes" for more autl-ority  of outside members
"After this quoted as BLP.
"BLP [S,p. 128-139]
7initiated  by, for example, the SEC or the NYSE.  Proposals with similar content have been
made by the American Law Institute, and there was even a legislative  attempt in the form oI
the corporate dtmocracy act of 1930, which, however, was not successful.
Another argument in favor of the separati&n  of the two institutions  again has to do
with the issue of information  processing  and decision-mr-Jing  at the top of large hierarchies.
While management  operates decision-making  in its environment  every working day, the
Aufsichtsrat  meets rather infrequently,  yielding  a naturai information  disadvantage  for the
Board members.
', J put comparatively  minor issues outside its reach of control is a protection of
management  against overly ambitious  Board members to step o-'ir their limits of
competence. This is also a feature that appears in management  contracts of smaller corpora-
tions.  They not only protect the owner from abuse by management,  but also management
from unnerving interference  in day-to-day  business by the owner.  We would like to argue
here that the combination  of the necessarily  limited information  of an Aufsichtsrat  member
and the limitc to his authority make the task of the Aufsichtsrat  as defined in the
Aktiengesetz  inere suitable  to the experience of a banker.
Another important difference  between the German and American system  of corporate
govemance is the philosophy  behind the motivation  to create an institution  of a Board in the
first place.  While in the US the function of the Board as a representative  of shareholders
dominates, the German Aufsichtsrat  is a more general forum for various groups of
stakeholders  to influencze  management.
This philosophy is most apparent with the passing of the "Mitbestimmungsgesetz'  in
1976, which gave labor representatives  of the firm up to almost half of the seats in the
Aufsichtsrat. Although this may have been triggered by the then common  practice of
bankers - also outside stakeholders  in the firm - to oe represented, it shows that the
Aufsichtsrat  is much more viewed as a democratic  negotiating  forum in Germany than in the
United States.  Much of the outrage of American  practitioners at the idea of bankers being
represented in their Boards is likely to come from their reality of an American Board of
Directors.  We would dare the hypothesis  that bankers' representations  on client firms'
Boards would iiot have happened  to the extent it did in Germany, if there was an American
style corporate governance system.
At the end of this chapter, we would like to have conveyed the insight that the control
met  :.nnisms  to be discussed hereafter are not per se alien to the tasks performed in a bank.
A Board mandate is almost a logical extension  of consulting services, and is to a significant
extent used as such.  From decision support to decision maldng is only a small step.
83.  German  banks and stock markets - feature  of a univenal
bsnklng system
In Germany's universal  l>nking system, banks are allowed to assume all functions
that in the USA would only be associated  with investment  banks: underwriting of equity
issues, stock brokerage, mnd  portfolio management. These activities themselves shall not be
the focus tf  this chapter, although they set the stage for the issues to be discussed here: the
role of banks in administering  stock owners rights in the Board"  nd the annual shareholders'
meetings. The three ways of the banks to assume a role in corporate governance institutions
are to hold significant  amounts of shares in the corporation, to act as voting 4ent  for small
investors in the annual shareholder meetings, or to have a member  of the bank hold a seat on
the Board directly.  In this chapter we shall provide factual information  on the extent of bank
control over industry by any of the three means, as well as an analysis of the effic-iency  or
dhawbacks  of this arrangeirent.
3.1.  Equity holdings of German banks
3.1.1.  Extent and structure of ownership
"German banks own German industry".  For a lot of p;actitioners as well as
academics,  this is a statement  that does not deserve further refiLection.  However, in Harm
(19] we have already provided statistics showing that actual ownership of real sector firms
cannot be too significant,  because the AG as the only publicly  listable corporate charter
accounts for only slightly more thin 20% of domestically  taxable revenues.  Most corporate
shares of banks are confined  to the AG.  Yet, a concern would be whether banks control a
major portion of the nation's largest firms, thereby shaping  domestic industrial policy not
only directly in the large corporations, but also indirectly when the decisions  of the large
firms trickle down to affect dependent  smaller businesses.
The first task in this chapter is then to assess the extent of banks' stock ownership in
the largest firms.  Appendix I shows the distribution  of ownership  among diffcrent groups of
owners in the 1argest  100 firms.  The table was compiled  from various tables in the
Monopolkommission's  [34,35] 1979 and 1989 reports.  The first report was not aimed at
giving a complete account  of ownersh l) in the largest firms so that the table has a number of
missing  ends, but the data improved  a lot until the most recent report, providing a general
picture of the structure  of ownership in Germany's large industry.
Until recently surprisingly  few companies  are majority owned by small investors - the
majority  of shares seemed to be in the hands of the larger institutional  investors, which
individually  or collectively  held the absolute majority in the respective  firms.  More
importantly, the stock ownership  of banks is not as pervasive as it is often perceived, and
was reduced furthermore during the last decade.
Moreover, the tables compiled  by the Monopolkommission  revealed that there is no
ownership link between the companies  in which the banks had a stake, and the companies
where other firms of the group of the largest 100 firms had a stake.  Not a single firm in
9which a bank had a significant  stake, hau a significant  stake in any other of the largest 100
firms so that the influence  of banks in terms of ownership is truly confined to the
corporations  listed.  Immenga [25,p.33] showed that in 1975 there were eight cases where
next to the bank there was another bank or another company from the top 100 listed as a
major shareholder, reducing the potential power of one single bank as a shareholder.  This is
even more pronounced  today, where no single bank has a majority stake in one of the top
100 firms.
One does have to note, however, that most individual  stakes in the listed companies
with bank ownership are held by the three largest German banks, showing that there is a
concentration  of ownership in the hands of tk  largest three banks.  Instead of the statement
that "German banks own German industry", we would suggest here that a more appropriate
statement  is "the three largest German banks held significant  shares in 13 of the largest 100
firms".
Table 1: Number of equity holdings of 10 largest private banks in non-banks
Mham-  size  1976  1m
1. All firms  129  86
10% - 25%  43  41
25% - 50%  67  37
greater 50%  19  8
2. Publicly listed
firms  77  51
10% - 25%  17  20
25% - 50%  49  28
greater 50%  11  3
source: Herrhausen (221
Also when we consider the holdings  of equity including the next smaller group of
firms, the issue of bank ownership  is not as pervasive as is commonly  assumed.  Table 1
from Herrhausen [22] was compiled  by the Federal Association  of German Banks in response
to the sixth report of the Monopolkommission,  and includes the holdings  of the ten largest
private commercial  banks, i.e. excluding sa,ings institutions  or cooperative  banks.
The 10 banks included in the survey also reported their reasons for 18 new
acquisitions  of shares in the 10 year period.  In six of the cases the banks reported that the
motivation  was simply a portfolio investment. All of these investments  were in the range of
10between 10% and 25%.  More important for this section, there were five cases where the
reason was given as placement  of equity, in four of these cases those were non-listed firms.
In another five cases, the reason was given as supporting  the equity base of undercapitalized
firms in the Mittelstand, and again four of these firms were not listed on any stock exchange.
These eight cases of non-listed  firms point at something  that can be regarded as a
central message that this chapter wants to deliver: banks can do only rather little about the
undercapitalization  of German industry, as the true bottleneck  seems to be the willingness  of
entrepreneurs  and managers  to charter as an AG and get listed.  In these eight cases, banks
were urged to find non-market means to increase the equity base of client firms by either
taking the equity on their own books, or by trying to place a non-marketable  share.  In only
one of the eighteen cases did a bank report that an equity stake was acquired to strengthen a
loan, suggesting  that the firm was in trouble, and the bank w&ited  to increase its control in
the firm.
In short, in the great majority of the (few) cases reported over the 10 year period the
motivation  for purchasing shares was rooted in either the unattractiveness  of becoming a
listed stock issuing firm, or simple portfolio  considerations,  although  the latter is an
argument that may well hide other intentions,  as a stake larger than 10% in a firm is likely
to be incompatible  with the conventional  wisdom of portfolio diversification. Nevertheless,
the survey suggests that there is little or no connection  between a bank's share purchasing
pol. ,y and lending activity." 2 In addition, the survey shows that banks did reduce their
holdings signifi antly over the 10 year period, although  it is not apparent, whether this was
due to political  pressure or economic  considerations.
3.1.2.  Critique and policy response
The equity holdings  of German banks have been a matter of continued criticism in the
country.  Even though the above data suggest that stock ownership is not very extersive,
there is a question whether banks should be allowed to hold shares in industry at all.  The
arguments against the status quo are most often linked to antitrust reasons.  The fear is that
bank ownership in various competing  firms can lead to monopolistic  price collusion to the
detriment of the consumer.  Factually, however, the Gessler commission  as well as the
monopolies  commission  have found that bank ownership permitting such behavior is only
observed in the brewing industry, and albeit the theoretical  possibility  of a cartelization of
that industry was not actually observed.
Nevertheless,  the monopolies  commission  recommended  to limit bank ownership to
5% of the equity capital of a firm, just because of the theoretical  possibility of undesirable
cartelization,  and the fact that one cannot rule out future bank behavior  in this direction to
stabilize the value of their shares.' 3 The Gessler commission  issued an analysis with similar
"lis  was also a conclusion  drawn by the Gessler commission  (see KrMimmel  (30], p.51).
13See Monopolkommission  [32,p.296], also Greiffenberg [16,p.90J
11conclusions  (Kr0mmel  [30,p.52]), but with softer policy recommendations,  asking for a limit
of only 25% plus one share, granting a bank a minority  veto.  Possibly in response to this
request, the banks have actually cut down most substantially  on their holdings  of more than
50% (see table 1), which is characteristic of the relationship  of German banks with the
government. Banks try to prevent limiting legislation  by conforming  to some extent with the
intent of a pending legislation.
Likewise, the Gessler commission  found no evidence that stock ownership influences
the client to prefer the respective bank to secure large scale loans or underwrite equity
issues.  The conclusion was rather that the clients where the banks had substantial  stakes had
sufficient  negotiating  power to look for the best service value in the market.  One banker that
was interviewed  in the course of this research mentioned  that the largest corporations in the
country had started already in the 1960s  to create a market for short-term funds among
themselves, showing for one thing that banks had to improve their services in response to
competition  from non-banks. Secondly, this behavior of the largest firms would have hardly
been possible, had banks had a significant  influence  over their clients to curtail such behavior
in their own favor.
The last major complaint with respect to banks' equity holdings  is that their position
makes them virtual insiders, for one thing being able to secure insider gains from their stock
holdings, and also being able to sell off stock in a firm that they receive negative information
about.  Nevertheless,  the Gessier commission  argued that such behavior was highly visible if
carried out on a large scale, and would surely ruin the respective bank's reputation in the
long run.  To the contrary, the Gessler commission  found that the experience had shown that
banks wikh  significant  equity holdings were actually more willing to support an ailing firm.
This last point deserves some further mention. The closer a firm gets into a crisis
situation, the more does the bank face an agency problem with respect to management. In
this author's previous work [20], it was argued that with more "realistic" assumptions about
the economic  agents, the solution to an agency  problem would include contracts specifying
some form of discretionary authority for the principal in some states of nature, meaning that
the traditional  agency solution of a rule-based  contract may be insufficient  to overcome the
agency problem.
What this means in the present context is that an optimal  debt contract does not only
specify rules such as covenants, but also authority provisions, which are the residual rights
held by an equity investor.  One of the means to achieve such a contingent  transfer of rights
is that the bank demands to hold equity in the first place so that there is a theoretical
possibility that an optimal long-tenr. financing  arrangement  between a firm and its bank
involves  the combined use of debt as well as equity instrurnents. 14 This would enable the
1 40ne can also make the converse  argument  that if the law precludes  bank holdings  of equity,
banks are by necessity  in a situation  that they have to secure timely exit as they do not have the
last resort of  directly influencing - or dismissing - managements, which may be the only
response  to an intensified  agency conflict. Such  reasoning  is supported  by the empirical  evidence
12bank to exercise influence especially  in times when managements  are exposed to counterpro-
ductive incentives.  Of course, it is empirically virtually not possible to prove that this kind
of financing arrangement is optimal in a given real-world situation so that we have to be
content at this point to make a case for its theoretical  viability.
This view of optimal financial  arrangements  also answyers  the criticism that banks are
not to hold equity, because depositors are almost by definition  risk-averse, and would prefer
the banks to hold safer debt contracts rather than risider equity contracts on its balance sheet.
If we view risk as entfrely statistical,  this is of course true, but in a model with behavioral
risk, the presence of equity in combin-ation  with debt contracts actually reduces the risk
exposure to the resective  client and hence serves the needs of the depositors rather than
contradict  them.
Finally, there is the point of view that the banks' equity holdings serve as hostages to
limit the firm's management's  ability to make decisions detrimental to the housebank. The
exchange  of hostages  provides a negotiated (market)  solution to the problem of specific  assets
as studied in Transactions  Costs Economics.' 5 To the bank, the loan contract is a specific
asset, as the bank depends on management's  decisions. Instead of writing state-contingent
contracts, it is a theoretically feasible  solution to the bank's problem to "hold managements
hostage' by holding equity.
3.2.  Acting as voting agents for equity investors
3.2.1.  Voting proxies in shareholder meetings of client fwnns
Even with comparatively  modest holdings  of equity in a client firm, German banks
are in a unique position to influence the outcome of the firms' shareholders  meetings  by
exercising  the proxy votes of the shareholders,  who have assigned their bank to handle the
administration  of their shares in one way or another.  Immenga [25,p. 102]  estimates that
banks owned only between 5% and 7.5% of the value of all circulating stocks, but that they
administered  between 50% and 55% of all circulating stock, leaving them with representing
around 60% of all circulating stock between 1963 and 1976. This, however, does not mean
that banks had the authority to vote for all shareholders  who had their shares in an account
with the respective bank, as the bank has to request the authority from the shareholder  at
least every 15 month, and the shareholder  is free to ask his bank to vote for his share
deviating  from the bank's suggestions. 16
of the combination  of Glass-Steagall  and "arms-length-banking"  in the United States.
"Williamson [47]
'6lmmenga [25] cites estimates from the banking sector, stating that only about 2% or 3%
of all shareholders  use their right to ask for specific  voting behavior so that the rest is up to the
banks' discretion.
13Although the representation  of up to 60% of total stock value in the economy would
theoretically  allow for the possibility that banks represent a majority in just about every
company's share-holder meetings, this is not true in reality, as most of the value of stock is
accounted  for by the 10 largest firms, 8 of which are majority owned by the general public.
Table 2 was compiled  by Immenga [25,n.  1041  for the data of 1975, and replicated from
Appendix II for the data of 1988, and shows those firms, in which banks could conceivably
wield influence  either through direct ownership, or by proxy vote.
Table 2: Possibilities of banks influencing the top 100 rwms  via ownership or proxy
votes
Rank  1-10  11-25 26-50 51-100  Total
A.  Firms controlled by small investors
Firms with bank  1975  1  0  6  14  21
ownership >25 %  1988  1  2  2  4  9
Firms w/o  known  1975  3  2  1  0  6
large investor  1988  0  0  0  3  3
Firms, where small inv-  1975  5  0  0  2  7
estors hold >  50%  1988  7  7  6  7  27
B.  Firms controlled by large investors
Firms with large inves-  1975  1  3  3  2  9
tors holding 50% - 75%  1988  1  3  3  15  22
Firms with large inves-  1975  0  10  15  32  57
tor holding 75% or more  1988  1  3  14  21  39
source: Immenga (1975) [25,p. 104];  Table lb (1988)
. ..  ..  . . . . . ..  . . . . . . ...  .
It becomes clear that banks cannot have voting power in the second set of firms,
which outnumber the first set of firms.  This means that also the voting proxies do not
fundamentally alter the conclusion that banks do not own - or control - German industry.
There is, however, an interesting trend observable  in Table 2, namely a move towards
decentralization. There are less firms with 75% majority investors, less firms with
significant  bank stakes, less firms with one or a few non-bank investors holding the majority
of shares, but more firms with an atomistic  ownership structure.  Hence, voting proxies are
becoming more important for banks these days.
14The discussion  on proxy votinig  has left the stage of questioning  the wisdom whether
there should be or should not be an institution collecting  and homogenizing  shareholders
votes." 7 Such an institution  is needed to overcome the externality  that leads to what
Demsetz [9] calls "rational voter apathy".  One can view this structure as an
institutionalization  of a collective  bargaining  process between shareholders  and managements
not unlike the formation of trade unions to represent labor in its negotiations  with
managements. After all, the increasing  wealth of the general public in the modern
industrialized  society should lead to an atomization  of capital owners resembling  the (natural)
atomization  of labor, leaving the providers of both factors of production in a similar
negotiation  position with managements,  which ic.  nothing but a recognition  of the managerial
society" 8 that we live in.
The question is rather whether such a function should be performed by banks, or
whether another set of institutions  could be envisioned to carry out the same task.
Obviously, the banks in a universal  banking system are in a natural position to assume this
role due to their securities markets dealings as well as the knowledge  of their clients.  K8rber
[29] and Herrhausen (22] argued that banks do not feel that they have an innate right to vote
for  shareholders, but that the present system survives for lack of better alternatives.
To be sure, there is a theoretical alternative  emerging in the United States these days,
where institutions  called proxy solicitors  exist that analyze firms for institutional  investors
and recommend  voting options based on this analysis.  As soon as the institutional  investors
represent a critical mass of shares, small shareholders  are convinced  to join the voting
recommendation. The problem with this approach is that the institutional  investor has to pay
for the services of the analyzing  company.  Once there is no institutional  investor having a
sufficient  interest in having the analysis done, the same externality  prevails that leads to
"rational voter apathy".
This is arguably the reason why the described system would fail in Germany.  If
banks gain any benefics  from controlling shareholder  majorities, they will gladly issue the
service to analyze the respective  corporation free of charge, which is what is happening now
so that there is no room for a potential  entrant in such a market.  It would require some form
of (potentially  controversial)  legislation,  to introduce the American system of shareholders'
vote pooling to the German market.  In short, although banks are not the only candidates to
administer voting proxies, it would be hard to envision any other set of institutions  taking the
place of the banks short of excluding  banks from the task by law, which is inconceivable
given .that  it is not even establishod  that bainks' wv&ig  prAxies  constitute  a pr6blem.
'7See Korber [29] for an extensive  argument for this case.
"As discussed  by Bearle and Means [3] and Dahrendorf [8].
153.2.2.  Voting proxies on bank shareholder meetings
The exercise of proxy votes by banks on their own shareholder  meetings seems to
contradict any intuition of democratic  ideals one might have, and one needs to take a closer
look at the mechanisms  of control over a bank.  It is not quite clear at first sight how such a
structure can prevent management  infringing shareholder  rights.  Obviously, what has been
said above about proxy votes in general is also true in the case of banks: Shateholders vote
on an agenda suggested by the Board, and the voting process itself has more symbolic than
democratic  value.  However, bank managements  would have the theoretical  opportunity in
this setup, to place only "loyalists" on the Board, thereby sidestepping  the control process.
It seems that shareholders' Boards  are not the most important  control institution  for a
bank, but it is the bank supervisors. However, especially the largest stock banks are rarely -
if ever -physically  audited by bank supervisors. German bank supervisors rely first of all on
the information  to be submitted in accordance  with the KWG.  Even if the bank supervisors
do not audit the bank themselves, irregularities  can be uncovered in tax audits or by the
auditor preparing the annual report.  The most important feature of the banking supervision
is that it has the power to veto new and throw out old bank managers.  Any major
irregularities  of a banks' management  would surely lead to the termination of the manager's
assignment.
However, it is not clear whether a modest  but unnecessary  increase in salaries,
fringes, or other administrative  expenses benefitting managements  with no apparent economic
gain to the bank would constitute  an irregularity in the sense of the KWG, and in this regard
shareholders  of the large banks are disenfranchised.
The relationship  between banks and their supervisory  agencies must be seen as a
reputational  equilibrium  as defined in the literature by Klein and Leffler [281, or Barzel [2].
Instead of a contractual  relationship  involving  constant monitoring  and negotiations,  a
reputational  equilibrium  enforces compliance  of implicit  contractual terms via the price
mechanism,  granting a monopolistic  rent stream to the party with the potential to exploit the
other.  Salaries, fringes, and tax shelters are the carrot, and the sanctioning  power of the
KWG is the stick enforcing compliance  with the objectives  of KWG.  In times of prosperity,
this solution  can be superior to any active contract enforcement, but we may be lucky that
Post-War Germany has not experienced  a major economic  and banking crisis.
3.3.  The ro,e of bankers on ciieit  rnms  Boards  -of  Directors
Part of the reason why voting proxies are seen as a solution rather than a problem is
that the issues voted on as well as the voting recommendations  are defined after continuing
and elaborate discussions  between the "Aufsichtsrat"  (after all the institution  supervising  and
controlling management)  and management. In that sense, shareholder  meetings are more of a
public relations event than anything  else, a point noted also by Korber [29].
This effect is especially strong if there is a banker in the Board, possibly even the
head of the Board, as then the voting recommendations  issued by the bank administering  the
16voting proxies is likely to be identical to the proposals  by the Board.  Hence, the true power
lies not in the banks' equity shares or voting proxies, but most importantly  in the banker
holding a seat on the Board.
Saying this, we have to remind the reader again about the two salient features
distinguishing  the American and the German Board structure, namely that every Board
member is a true outsider as there are no managers  on the Board, and that the Board serves
as a negotiating  forum for capital and labor according to the "Mitbestimmungsgesetz".  This
is again important to stress, as for one thing an outside Board limits the Board members'
authority to interfere in the day-to-day management  process, but strengthens his position to
make personnel  decisions  at the top management  level.
At the sarne time, the inherent conflict  of interest between capital and labor asks for a
broader consensus  among Board members, which lets the conflict of interest between bankers
and shareholders  or managements  seem rather small. This is to argue that the German
legislative  system does not leave a banker on a Board as an odd phenomenon,  but rather a
symbol of the general idea of the German Board: a consensus  shaping mechanism  for the
various stakeholders  in the firm.  Table 3 shows the extent of Board membership  by bankers
as well as the distribution  of the memberships  among different groups of banks.  The
numbers show that Board representation  is a much more common  means to influence firms
than equity holdings  or voting proxies, which should not be surprising given that it is also
more effective  than the other two means.
Given the large number of AG's with bankers  on their Boards compared with the
number of firms with significant  bank equity holdings, it is clear that the majority of AG's
have a banker on the Board without the bank owning significant  amounts of shares in the
respective  firms.  This tendency  is even more pronounced  when we consider that bankers
hold significant  numbers of Board seats in GmbH's and other corporate forms, in which it is
more difficult and unlikely that they have an equity stake.  This falls also into the theoretical
framework  of optimal debt contracts with authority provisions and shows that equity
ownership is not mandatory  to achieve that goal, which supports Herrhausen's [22] claim that
the bulk of banks' equity investments  is made solely for the purpose of achieving  capital
gains.
The importance  of Board membership  by bankers becomes  even more apparent when
we consider only the 100 largest corporations  in Germany. The 1976/77 report of the
- ..  . nopolies-comminssion  (33]  showed that bankrcs.  were rpesented  in 75 of the 84  firmrn
having  an Aufsichtsrat. 19 In 31 cases they committed  the president of the Board, and out of
these 31 cases, 18 cases were accounted  for by Deutsche Bank  alone.  The concentration
among the largest firms should not come as a surprise, however, as the costs of monitoring
via Board membership :an  be considered roughly independent  of firm size so that a bank
would maximize  returns from monitoring  by selecting  the largest firms first.
19Companies  chartered  as KG, OHG, or sole proprietorship  are not required to have a Board
according to the "Mitbestimmungsgesetz"  regardless  of their size.
17Table 3: Board member distribution  among bank groups in 1974
Bank group  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Savings  bank  14  4  6  29  23  7  7  66  119
Giro Centers  10  13  16  86  72  14  5  82  170
Large  6 banks  6  91  100  405  320  24  19  71  483
Regional  banks  26  61  72  252  202  16  9  55  314
Private bankers  23  49  38  170  137  4  3  14  185
Cooperative  banks  8  2  4  19  16  2  4  31  73
Total  94  220  236  986  6d  67  47  319  1344
(Ti.  "
Explanation  of columns:
(1): # of banks reporting Board members
(2): # of bankers holding the presidency of the Board
(3): # of bankers holding  the vice-presidency  of the Board
(4): # of bankers reported as Board members
(2) to (4) refer to Boards of AG's
(5): # of firms with bankers on the Board (only AG's)
(6) to (8) are the same as (2) to (4), but for GmbH's
(9): # of bankers holding Bo.rd seats including AG's,
GmbH's as well as all other legal incorporations?'
source: Monopolkommission  [32,p.256],Immenga  [25,p. 109]
Regardless  of how prevalent  the presence of bankers in German Boards is, one may
not forget the role of the Board as a negotiating  forum between capital and labor.  Table 4
shows the membership  structure of the Boards of the largest 100 firms.  As was the intent of
the law, not quite half of the Board members  are labor representatives. Moreover, the
unions associated  with the DGB account for more members  than all banks combined, and
they would certainly have more overlapping  goals than the different banks.  Not regarding
the issue of Board presidency, one may then treat the issue of the power of the DGB with
equal importance  te the issue of the power of the banks.  Moreover, the table confirms the
notion voiced above that in the way German law defined Board structure, the banker is not
an "add man out".
2CDeviation  because of multiple representation
21According  to the "Mitbestimmungsgesetz"  Jating May 4th 1976, all AG's, GmbH's, as
well as KGaA's with more than 2000 employees have to have an Aufsichtsrat with labor
representation.
18Table 4: Board composition in the largest 100 fims  in 1986
Member's institutions  # of  of
Boards  Board
members
Private banks  59  114
Other banks  37  51
Employees/Managers  from industry  81  368
Politicians/Government  employees  24  69
Other representatives  of Capital  61  147
Members of trade unions  77  197
Thereof: Unions associated  with the DGB  76  181
Other labor representatives  83  520
Total  84  1466
source: Herrhausen (22,p. 108]
One may even consider that bankers hold the presidency of the Board more often,
because they represent a third group of stakeholders  having 'capital-like" incentives  due to
their equity holdings and market making activities  in common  stock, as well as "labor-like"
like incentive owing to the fact that debt as well as labor represent  a fixed claim on the firm,
in which case they would be an ideal mediator in a German Board.  This, however, must
remain a speculative  issue as labor representatives  are the first to attribute banks to the
"capitalist"  side (see Greiffenberg [16]), and one cannot dismiss the possibility that also the
bank as a lender can theoretically  make decisions to expropriate labor.
Yet, one banker interviewed  in the course of this research stated that he usually
defended labor interests during Board negotiations,  for example by sponsoring  increases in
the company's pension  fund for its employees. This is definitely  not in the immediate
interest of the bank, and only supports the role of the Board president to act as a mediator
between capital and labor interests.  These issues lead directly to the heart of the discussion
on the power of the German banks in German industry, namely the possibility of conflicts of
interest that could induce the banker to exploit his position of influence  in contradiction  to
the intent of the position.
3.4.  ConfUlcts  of interest
In this section we have to address the question more closely, in how far the
controversial  issues in German banking, namely equity ownership, proxy votes, and Board
memberships,  interfere with the "proper" incentives  and interests of a universal bank, and
how a bank with significant  influence  in any of the three areas can use its power to the
detriment of any other group, and there are obviously many: banks are dealing with
managements,  union representatives,  labor leaders from within the respective firms, other
19banks that compete for market share in any service provided by universal banks, majority
shareholders, and small shareholders.
All of these stakeholders  and potential  stakeholders  have among themselves  conflicting
interests in the decisions concerning  the firm, and one would have to ask in the first place,
what the proper incentives  of a bank are, and what the resulting ideal behavior would be that
we would like to see in a bank.  From the point of view of a regulator, this ideal of the role
of banks in a society would have to established first, before one can go on to analyze,
whether the criticized features of German universal banks actually interfere with the
hypothetical  ideal.
3.4.1.  Fms'  value maximizing behavior and the conflicts of
Interest among different groups of stakeholders
Taking the position of a regulator, the hypothetical  ideal would be a situation in
which externalities  are minimized  given the presumption  that externalities tend to retard
economic  growth as the economic  agents are more concerned with exploiting the externality  -
thus transferring existing wealth to them from other economic  agents - rather than being
concerned  about creating economic wealth through growth.  Externalities  principally must be
viewed as a source of econornic  waste, be it labor or capital that is used to exploit the
externality.
The problem of exernalities is in some sense synonymous  to the agency problem, as
the decision-making  agent has the power and opportunity  to expropriate the principal due to
their hicrogeneous information  and interests. As is well known, the theoretical solution to
this conflict lies in the less-informed  principal providing  incentives to the agent to harmonize
their interests.  Ronald Coase 171  has shown in his seminal  paper that in the absence of
communication  barriers such as asymmetric  information, there need not be any externalities,
as any such problem could be solved via negotiations  of the involved  parties which yield a
mutually accepted  consensus.
Albeit the presence of cultural norms that try to define a certain homogeneity  within a
society,22  it would be futile to believe that in today's diverse societies this can be a way to
eliminate  all conflicts associated  with externalities. The most efficient solution to a conflict
of interest is primarily the decentralized  one: negotiations  involving  all interested parties.
Only if this is not feasible  due to massive  communication  problems - be they asymmetric
information  or the largeness of numbers of involved  parties - do we need to find a more
efficient governance  structure for decision-making,  be it institutions  that negotiate for a large
clientele  of members, or be it laws sanctioning  the exploitation  of an extemality.
2This has been tried in the socialist  countries with well-known  results,where the education
system was supposed  to condition  people to ut.iformly  work towards the goals of the socialist
society.
20Translating these general insights to the problem of the various interests of the various
claimholders  against a firm, it is important to note is that in the first step the firm generates
economic  value, and that only in the second step do the claimholders  argue on how to split
the gains among  each other.  The task is then to set the conditions for the firm's management
to maximize firm value, and to distribute the gains among the claimants with the least
friction.
The above reasoning suggests that the preferred solution  would be a negotiated
outcome, if that is not prevented by excessive communication  problems.  For the first goal,
maximizing  firm value, Myers [36] has shown that in the presence of debt financing,  a
management  acting in the interest of equity owners alone may not undertake a positive NPV
project.  This underinvestment  problem would not be present, were management  liable to an
established  consensus  between debt and equity claimants, and not equity investors alone.
Similar arguments could be made for the relationship  between capital and labor.
We want to suggest with such reasoning that the composition  of the German Board
consisting  of members of various interest groups, mitigates  the problem of management  not
maximizing  firm value due to reasons of stakeholder  conflicts  alone.  The conflict between
Board and management  is partially resolved by defining a true outside Board that
management  has to report to, and may not be a part of.  Likewise, the division of the firm's
economic  gains between wages, salaries, interest, and dividends is defined in a consensus
process involving  all parties.
Obviously,  there are also reasons against such a broad Board structure, namely the
likelihood  of negotiations  deadlock because of too much heterogeneity  of its participants.
These are the kdnds  of transactions  costs that would make alternative  corporate governance
structures preferable, and it is clear from the discussion  preceding the passing of the
"Mitbestimmungsgesetz"23  that these were precisely the fears of the representatives  of
"Capital": time consuming  negotiations  with labor would now be continued in corporate
Boards, leaving no more room for a meaningful supervisory  function.  The practice in the
last 15 years has shown that continued  partisan decision-making  in the Boards has not
dominated the news so that the experiment  seemed to have worked according to the original
intent.
To propose the German Board system as a solution to the problem of managements
not maximizing  the value of the firm does, of course, require a big conceptual  leap away
from the understanding  of property rights as is still found in the United States today, where
ownership rights belong only to the shareholders, and they are hence the only ones deciding
on who may serve on the Board to represent them. Bleicher, Leberl, and Paul [S,p.431
quote Milton Friedman: "In a free-enterprise,  private-property  system, a corporate executive
is an employee  of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility  to his employers.
That responsibility  is to conduct the business in accordance  with their desires, which
23See  Der  Spiegel [11] with a  1968 cover issue on  legislated labor representation on
corporate Boards.
21generally will be to make as much money  as possible  while conforming  to the basic rules of
the society, both those embodied in laws and those embodied in ethical customs."
BLP comment  that the unequivocal  subordination  of management  under the owners
rejects any considerations  of external interests.  One may not forget that also the creation of
property rights in a society was a means towards an end in the sense that only property rights
could provide sufficient  incentives  to individuals  to participate creatively in the business
process, thereby increasing the wealth of the society.  This has been proven by contradiction
with the recent experiences  of the socialist countries. However, it is not a reason, to view
property rights as an end in themselves,  and if shareholders  collectively  waive parts of their
property rights in an attempt to overcome agency problems24  with other claimants on the
firm, then this is a Pareto-superior  solution to the conflict, hence socially desirable.
The point made in this section was that the structure of the German Board as a
negotiating  forum among different claimholders  ultimately  serves the purpose to maximize
firm value.  NJext,  we have to analyze how bankers fit into this structure.
3.4.2.  The conflict oo interest within a universal bank
Subsequently,  we are going to argue that a universal  banking system averts the
problem of a factionalization  of stakeholder  interests. The banker in Germany  issues loans to
his clients, underwrites their equity in financial  markets, and markets these claims to the
general public.  Hence, there are three profit centers within the bank that could potentially
benefit from any influence  of the bank, be it via proxy votes and equity holdings or Board
seats.  Not considering  the problem that shareholders  within themselves  are a highly
heterogeneous  groups, making it difficult for that part of the bank that deals in equities to
adequately  represent their clientele in order to take market share away from competitors,
there is a fundamental  conflict  of interest between the lending side of the bank and the
equity-dealing  side of the bank.
Once a bank would induce management  to act overly conservative  in order to secure
the repayment  of the loans, the bank would act against its interest to maximize share value
and attract retail business in the equity markets.  The same conflict occurs, when it comes to
the dividend  decision.  One banker interviewed  in the course of this project that had held
Board seats including Board presidencies  in his career stressed that he had usually argued to
increase the dividend, reflecting that he had taken the side of the shareholders  in their
negotiations  with management,  which would instead prefer to have profits allocated to
retained eamings.
7AIt  must be  noted again here that  due  to  the  assumption of  bounded rationality in
transactions cost economics, the solution to  an agency conflict may involve the transfer of
authority, as for example  the partial transfer of property rigiats.  This solution  could not be fount!
in an agency model with the traditional  assumptions  of "economic man".
22This was supported in discussions  with other bankers who stated that the fee earning
business of securities  dealings was more lucrative than the interest business in loans, and it
supports again the conclusion  drawn by the monopolies  commission  that banks "intimate"
relations with industry were rather independent  of their lending business.
Likewise, the monopolies  commission  had not found significant  links between banks'
power and their ability to influience  firms' decisions when it came to selecting an agent to
underwrite equity issues, as they argued that the few firms that frequently  went to the market
to finance their ventures had enough negotiating  power to override any non-competitive
interests of the bank.  Bannock [l,p.230J actually made ths reverse point, which was also
confirmed  by a manager of a large company  interviewed  here: 'A house-bank  that did not
show solidarity with management  (by advising its cliLnts  to buy shares in its company  and
advising them to vote their shares with management  on shareholders  meetings) would soon
cease to be the company's house-bank."
This, of course, turns the whole discussion on the power of the banks upside down,
and makes this more of an issue of the lack of power of the banks, because they are in a
vulnerable position due to their business interests.  This seemed to be the only critique of the
system where bankers hold proxy votes and seats on the Boards that was not rejected by any
evidence available. One may not forget, howevter,  that the president of the Board has - in
case it is called for - the decisive  vote whether to dismiss management  or not so that there is
ultimately  a healthy balance of power.
T'he  first conclusion  in this section should be that there is no apparent evidence for the
abuse of power of the banks when it comes to either securing business away on a grand scale
from competing banks, nor neglecting the interests of small equity investors in favor of the
banks loan portfolio.  The only problematic  issue may be that banks are not strong enough to
represent shareholders in their negotiations  with management.
Moreover, the banker himself has so many competing  interests that it is unlikely that
he chooses one in favor of another one.  This brings us back to the basic question that we
started out with: What are the appropriate incentives  of a banker? Especially when the bank
holds both an equity stake23  as well as loans in the firm, it becomes  clear that the banks
incentives  resemble more those of an owner-manager  in an unleveraged  firm (with the
exception  of the incentives  versus other debt holders), which counters the negative
consequences  of a factionalization  of stakeholder  interests, and it may be precisely this
feature of a universal banker that makes him a prominent candidate  for a Board position.
In the course of the consensus-shaping  process between the various stakeholders  of a
firm, the Board structure as defined by German law is supposed  to minimize  the impact of
stakeholder  conflicts on firm policy.  The banker is a likely candidate  of a Board president,
because his incentives  are closest to the incentives  of the firm viewed as a whole.  He is the
2"The  same effect is achieved  through the bank's involvement  in equity markets, as they are
also representing  equity interests to attract retail investors.
23person most likely to support the process of reaching a consensus, which is vital for the
efficiency of the Board given that capital and labor representatives  have such heterogeneous
interests.
It must be stressed again that the conclusion  to support Board membership  of bankers
is not universally true, but is rooted in three important features of the German system: that
the Board is a true outside Board, that its composition  is very heterogeneous, and that the
banker in a universal  banks shares the incentives  of debt and equity alike, and is hence most
interested  in the growth of tbe asset side of the balance sheet, rather than redistribution  on
the liability  side.
3.S.  From collateral to creditworthiness lending
We have argued above that because of the possible  authority granted to bankers
through equity shares, proxy votes, and Board seats, banks would be more willing to lend
long-term as opposed to those banks that do not enjoy these privileges. We want to argue
for another advantage  that comes with this structure.
While the academic literature has essentially  decided to talk mostly about loan
valuations  in terns  of the probability  of repayment, the real world of banking in Germany
seems to be far from the ideal of creditworthiness  lending. Gessner et. al. [15] showed in a
study on bankruptcies  that banks were on average able to secure 85% of the amount of loa;s
in default through their collateral.
A banker interviewed  in the course of this research stated that the presence of a
representative  of the bank on the respective  company's Board made it more likely that the
company  received unsecured  funds, which then obviously reduced the liquidity constraints of
the company  because of the informational  advantage  the bank gains with the Board seat.
Unfortunately, there are no data available to support this claim, but Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Sharfstein [231  found similar evidence in the Japanese market, making this argument also
plausible for the German banks.
The important thing to realize when discussing  the issue of the power of German
banks is that they may actually be seeking  influence  for the sole purpose of expanding their
business. Similar to the credit guarantee agencies, which provide the banks with security in
the absence of collateral, the influence  of banks in large firms, which are not eligible for
government  support for obvious reasons, may serve as a substitute for collateral.
In the absence of governance  structures that ensure a continued relationship  of trust
between borrower and lender, financial  claims cannot - by virtue of the nature of the product
- be traded in a highly competitive  spot market.  Banks' seats on Boards  or their voting
proxies may simply support a relationship  of trust when no material security is available. In
the language  of Williamson (47] firms would provide hostages  to support the exchange of
funds - the same rationale as applied to equity holdings  above.  These arguments go hand ir.
hand with the statements made by bankers in the interviews that there is comparatively  little
no price discrimination  between loans contingent  on the risk of the borrower.  Financial
24markets function only to a small extent via the price mechanism. Riskier borrowers are
rationed out of the market.  In that sense, the abolition of banks' source of power would
predictably  lead to less liquidity in industry.
3.6.  The hov,  ;ebamk  as an equity underwriter  and the question of under-
capitalzation of German industry
Discussants  of the German financial  system never fail to stress the low equity
endowment  of German industry.  Likewise, the report issued by the Verband der Vereine
Creditreform [43] singled  out low equity capital as one of the most commonly  stated reasons
for bankruptcy. As the banks are responsible for placing the claims on the capital markets,
they are often subjected  to the blame for 'retarded" equity markets. We cannot follow this
point of view here.
First of all, a true comparison  of equity ratios across nations would require a
comparison  of the possibilities  under the respective nation's tax laws to build hidden
reserves.  Especially  with respect to real estate valuation, but also to some extent with
respect to building precautionary  reserves, German firms seem to enjoy some discretion to
add to hidden reserves. 26
More important  in this context, we know that there are only about 2000 firms
chared  as AG, and these are the only firms that banks help with their capitalization.
Moreover, banks seem to enjoy higher profits in the equity business than in the loan business
so that they actually have every incentive  to convince a client firm to go public.  The
imiting factor is not the banking system, but it is the legal definition  of the AG as a
corporate charter, with disclosure  requirements  and labour representation  on the Board as
strong disincentives  to go public.
We have shown in Harm (18] that German industry is made up to a large extent of
smaller firms that are not publicly  traded.  The industry is still separated into two distinct
groups: the few large AG's, which are subjected to one of the world's most rigorous
standards  of corporate democracy, and the bulk of all other firms, which live under rather
old-fashioned  "capitalist"  corporate governance  structures.  At least when it comes to the
smaller firms in the "Mittelstand", one may well argue whether it needs legal standards to
enforce corporate democracy in an environment  where the numbers of involved people is
small enough to allow for individual  negotiations. In any event, the conclusion here must be
that despite the German banks' involvement  in equity markets, the true reasons for the
26This  can also counter the criticism by Steinherr  and Huveneers [42] that the large extent
of financing  via retained earnings show the weakness  of the German banks to finance industry
appropriately.  Hidden reserves are built with tax shelters, making  the self-financing  a result of
tax legislation.  According to the pecking order theory of finance, internal financing  is always
preferred to external financing, and the support of  the former via tax shelters makes self-
financing  the choice of an entrepreneur, not the failure of banks.
25undercapitalization  of German industry - if it is truly a problem - mTust  be searched for in the
legislative  system that defines corporate charters.
264.  Summary and fral  analysis  X
Authority has been a part of societies  since the beginning  of the formation of social
groups, and it has been a pervasive issue ever since.  The problem with the concept is that
authority is redundant if it does not face dissent, but that it is challenged  with abuse of power
from those that have a dissenting  opinion.  In that spirit, the issue of the power of German
banks is not an issue about banks, but an issue about the concepts  of power and authority.
Authority is especially sinister to the economist,  who has been trained to study decentralized
markets, and authority carries the bad taste of socialist  planned economies. Only recently
has the economic  profession discovered the efficiency  properties of authority, analyzed in
detail by Williamson's [46] theories on Transactions  Cost Economics. We have selectively
made a case above that such reasoning - applied to the nature of financial  claims - may well
lead to efficient debt contracts with authority provisions materializing  in Board seats, proxy
votes, or equity ownership.
While it is true that these issues defining the power of the banks may have their roots
only in the history of the German banking system,  and may have outlived their cause in
today's world, we mean to have shown above that these institutions  have maintained  their
existence  due to external factors, most notably the legislation  defining Board composition  and
bankruptcy  legislation. It is still possible to make a case for the efficiency  properties of the
mode of financing  of large industry in Germany  in the given legislative  environment,
although  the hypothesis  is empirically untestable. In the absence of empirical tests
determining  the optimal mode of financing, a critique of the present mode of financing  large
industry in Germany  has to focus on the abuses verified in the present system. When it
comes to anticompetitive  pressures exerted by banks, be it in the banking system itself or in
industry, banks have been vindicated  by all major studies examining  the banking system'.
The same holds true for the issue of conflicts of interest between the major stakeholders  in
the corporation, and we have suggested  above that the present structure of corporate
governance  may well be the one in which managers  are provided with the correct incentives
to maximize firm value.
The recommendations  of the monopolies  commission  [34] to limit bank ownership of
non-bank  firms to between 5% and 10% of the enterprise, and the softer recommendation  of
the Gessler commission  to limit bank ownership  to a blocking minority  (25 % plus one
share), are all based on the potential for abuse, but not on actually verified abuse.  We can
go back to what was said above: the potential  for abuse is a phenomenon  that is by definition
linked to the concept of authority so that limiting legislation does not necessarily  address the
particular features of the financing  of large industry, but is rather an expression  of man's
innate fear of the abuse of power by an authoritative  position.
Legislation  according to the recommendations  has not been passed in Germany, and
we portray the view here that this was the correct policy response, as the mere potential for
27Monopolkommission  [32,34], Gessler  Commission  (Kriimmel  [30]), Economists  Advisory
Group (171, Biischgen  [6]
27abuse of power cannot be a trigger for legislative  action, but only verified abuse due to a
tilted balance of power, which has not been detected in Germany.  It would therefore also be
a major mistake  to follow the recommendations  of Steinherr and Huveneers [421  to pass
baning  legislation for the European Community  to that respect, as also they have nothing
else to offer but the potential for abuse.
The success of the German banking system will be decided in the European
marketplace,  and it is may well be that German banks will act very differently in another
European country with a different  legal and cultural environment. To deny the German
banking system a test in the marketplace  on the basis of hypothetical  problems would be a
potential limitation  of the efficiency  of the emerging European financial marketplace.
It is often challenged that the undercapitalization  of industry is displaying a major
weak point in the financial system. We have been arguing above that the large extent of self-
financing may well have its roots in the tax laws allowing  the build-up of hidden reserves.
These hidden reserves should first of all be counted towards equity, which could arguably
improve the standing  of German industry in international  statistics  on capitalization.
Moreover, the build-up of hidden reserves and the accompanying  financing  via depreciation
is a matter of natural choice according to the pecking order theory of finance, and does not
necessarily imply a weakness of the financial  institutions.
Likewise, the small size of German equity markets is not a consequence  of German
banks preferring to issue loans to their clients. According to the bankers that were
interviewed, the profit motive leads them to argue for firms going public.  The binding
constraint is the legal definition  of the AG as a corporate charter, limiting the demand of
entrepreneurs  to go public.  We may see significant  changes when the European Community
decides to define corporate charters that can be adopted throughout Europe.
In this author's opinion, one of the most important reasons for the success of the large
industry in Germany  are the rigorous standards of corporate democracy as laid out in the
legal definition  of Board structure.  The quality of financial  intermediation  rises and falls
with the quality of a governance structure  representing the interests of investors and creditors
alike.  The inclusion  of labor in the consensus  process has led to rather peaceful Capital-
Labor relations in Germany, reducing the agency costs of repeated strikes.
Similar costs arising from the conflict between debt and equity are reduced by the role
of banks in the financing  process.  The present Board structure reduces the negotiation  costs
between the various stakeholders  in the firms by strengthening  the decentralized  consensus
shaping  process, ultimately  providing  the best incentives  for managements  to maximize firm
value unimpeded  by stakeholder  conflicts.
Although  we are aware of the political obstacles  in a number of countries today to
pass legislation  towards corporate democracy, the beginning  step is to define a Board as a
forum of true outsiders with largely control responsibilities,  curtailing the Board's authority
with regard to ongoing managerial  decisions. This structure  was legislated  in Germany
already in the 1870s, and such a Board structure leads to a natural evolution towards a
28negotiating  forum for all stakeholders, ultimately  also explaining  the role of German banks in
the corporate goverance  institutions  today.
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Volksw!genwerk  AG  1  20,00%  0__  _  _  0,00%
Siemens  AG  2  _  I  1 80,00%
Oaimler-Ssnz  AG  3  _  "50%  10,00%  14,00%
Thyssen  AG  4  -26%  65.00%
VEGA  AG  5  44,00%  - 56 00%
BASF AG  6  >80%
AEGTelefunken  7  >60%
Hoechst  AG  8  __  - - >80%
Ruhrkohis  AG  9  27.20%  13,02%
Bayer  AG  10  >80%
RWE AG  11  >60%  _  _
Friednch  Krupp GmbH  13  74,99%  25,01%
ESSO AG  14
Gutshoffnungshu.tte  Aktiemein  15  30,00%  -20%  _
Fi'ck  Industneverwaltung KGeA  17  100,00%
Deutsche  Shali  AG  18
Mannesmann  AG  19  >80%
Bosch GmbH  22
Mstailgbessllchaft  AG  23  > 50%  > 25%  16,46%  _
Rosmtsms Ciguesentabriken  GmbH  24  65,00%
Gelsenbera  AG  26  96,10%
Saizgirler  AG  28  100.00%  _
Karstedt  AG  30  >50%  _
ARAL  AG  31  -84%  _
Deutsche BP AG  32  _  -
Kaufhof  AG  33  >50%
Gustav Schickedent KG  40  100,00%
Ootker-Gruppe  41  100,00%  _  -=_-
Hernke  KG_A  43  100,00%  _
loocknr  Humbodt  ut  44  _A  650%  _  >60%
Deutscha Lufthans  AG  45  !  >75%_
C&A Breannk__myer  47  !  - - 100,00%
Ia3rsche  Motorenwerke AG  49  1  _70%
CO OP Zantrale  AG  50  s  22,40%  77,60%
Standard Elaktnk  Lorenz AG  51  85.93%.
Philipp Hoitmenn AG  52  I  >50%
Mobil Oil AG  53  _
Hochtef AG  54  >25%  33,89%
BsvWa  AG  55  > 256%  I
Ssaabergwerke  AG  Ss  100.00%  __  _
0egugs1  I  57  > 25%  > 12%  _  _  _>50%
Klonckner-Werke  AG  58  _  > 28%  >_  >50%
Preussag  AG  59  40,00%  'S 0%
Neckermann  Voremnd  AG  S61  S1i20%_
Horten  AG  62  25,00%  - >25%  _
Oeutsche Babcock  Ag  65  _| 5  >5%  25 02%  _  __  70%
VEW AG  o  66  52,56%  >15%  7,59%  - _  _
Vereinigte lndustrieunternehmen  AG  67  100,00%
Bosch-Siemens  Hausgersete GmbH  ,  68  4  50.00%  |
Otto Wolff AG  69  75%
Dvckerhoff & Widmann  AG  72  |  o6,00%  13,00%  -30%  . __I
Stahiwerke Roechling-Surbach GmbH  73  _  2,10%  97,90%
Ruhrpas AG  74  _1  _  _  550%  34,80%I
Continental Gumimi-Werke  AG  I75  |  <25%  11,59%  >60%
StrabagauAG  76  _  >25%  _  >50%
Chemisch.  Wnrke Huses  AG  77  _  100,00%
Stahlwedrk Suedwestalen  AG  78  _  __  _  _  _  98.90%  |  |
_G|undl  AG  79  ._..___  >12% 1-|
_apagULoyd  AG.  80  >75%  _  -
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Aqfa Goveert AG  _  81  _  50.00%  1_  _  150,00%  1
Mosserechmidt-Baelkow-Blohm GmbH  82  28.05%  _  22.02%  4,89%  12,75%S
Otto Vereend  83  _  50.00%  15,00%S_
Stumm GrnbH - Mebenaft Gnippe  84  _  ___  >60%
Axel Springer Verlag AG  86  _  100.00%  S 
Schering AG  87  O_  _  _  >50%
AG der Dillinger  Huettenwerke  92  __  > 25%  >50%
Wilhelm Werhahn  94  - _  100,00%  _
Getreide-Import GmbH  98  100,00%
Undo AG  100  _  _  _  _  '90%
Benrteamnnn  AG  8670  _  _  89,30%  -
Bilfinge +  Berger Sau-AG  73 *  <50%  _  >50%
Franz  Hanild & Cie. GmtbH  76  _  _  99,00%  _  _
Bp"mwerk  AG  770  60,00%  _  40,00%
Tendefmenn Werenhandelsgesellachsft  79 - 100,00%
Elf Minerelodl GmbH  900  2,83%
Maginr-DOeutz  AG  83-  98,00%  1
E. Kampffmoyer  88s  '_  100,00%
Zahnradfabrik Friedrichehafen  I 89  T  4,0010,0
Touristik Union International GmbH KG  i  95*  12,37%  %
Rheineche Olefinwerke GmbH  1  990  I--  __  |  100,00%
1978 ranking, as no 1972 ranking  I  i-  I
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Daimler-Benz  AG  3  1  1 2,00%  134.90%  14.00%  ___  ____  44,60%  450
SeesAG  2  2  1  . f_  F  I%  10.00%  90,00@J
Volkswagenwerk  AG___3  _17_0  ___82_40
HoechstAGa  >2%<  %
Ruhrkohle  AG  9....a.  90.50%  _____9,50%
VEBAAG  5  9  II  100.00%
Thy'ssen AG.  4  10lo  ___  9,90%  ___  25,60%  54,50%
RWE AG  I11  1 1  2.10%  ____30,80%  _  _  630
Deutsche Bank AG  I  1  2  ____4,__  1  0-0,I  00 %-
Bayrische  Motratnwerke  AG  49  14  0,80%  5,00%  ____  0.0 1%  44,19%
Ford-Werke  AG  /  is  __________  99,80%  _____0.20%
Deutsche Lufthansa AG  45  6  5,00%  1___  71.45%  ______23,55%  ___
Adam 0pellAG  /  ~1L  1100,00%1
IBM  Deutschlanid  GmbH  I  a8~_________  100,00%  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  ____
Dresdner  Bank  AG  ti_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  ____  __  ___  ___
Fiedrnch  Krupp  GmbH  1  3  [201_______  _  I  25,01%  ____  74, 99%  _________
MAN  AG  _____  /  21  ~  21.20%  ____________78.80%  ___
Allianz  Holding  AG  I/  22  I  {7S,00%  I25.00%
Messersohmidt-Boelkow-Slohm GmbH  82  1231  13.7%  : 14,60%  10,70%  52.30%  8.70%  ___  ____
Comrnmrzbank  AG  24I%  O,0  ___
Karstadt  AG  30  25i  >so  ____  ___I  <S0%  ____
Sazite  G28  2  _  _  __  __  _  __1100.00%  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Hoesch  AG  ti7l  [100,00%
AlIg. Doutsche Philips lndustne Gmbl4  I  28  I._____  1100.00%  ___
Asea Brown Boveni AG  j29  _____76,00%  24__00__
FeldmOhIa  Nobel AG  30.  I  -_  __  100.00%
Deutscha  Unilever  Gmbl4.....  32  ____  ___  100.00%  I___  ____  ___
Zahnradfebnik  Ffiedrchshafen  /133  I____  ____  ________  100,00%  I,____
Standard Elektrik Lorenz AG  1  SI  34  j  ____  T___  85,90%  ____  14,10%
Kauf hot  AG  ' 33  135!  <SO%_>_0_
Gustav Schickedanz KG  401  36  ____I  100.00%  I____
9ayensche Vereinsbank  AG  867_____T_  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _1_  _  _  _  _  a,00%  i  _14  _00  _
Degussa  57.  38  17,00%  12.50%  1  ____j____  63.00%  1  7,50%
Saarbergwetrke  AG  I  SO  3.  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  100,00%  _  _  _  _  ____  ____
VEW AG  as6  40  13,40%  >1  5.9%  1  i>50%  ____  . 20,7%  ____
Bayer.  Hype.-  und  Wechsalbank  AG  ___  1  41  ____  24.20%  I  ______________  75.80%  _____
Metallgesallschaft AG  23  42.  8,68%  42,50%,,  35.00%  I_________13.82%
ITT Gas. fCar  Betetligungen  mbH  I  43  I  ________  100,00%1
Carl-Ze,ss-Sdiftunip  /  44-1  10.0
ieartlelsiann AG  {  45  i _______  0000
Preukea  OAG  so'  4  48,80%  _____  5,00%  I46,20%
Henkel  KGoA  431  47T  _  ___I70,00%  T21,50%  8,50%
Nixdorf  Computer  AG  i  4  ________  _______ 
BATIG Gas. frjrBetedligungen  mbH  49  '  +  00%I  500%I5,0
Continental Gurnnmi-Werke  AG  10SO  I.  -1000 
FAG  Kugelfischer  Georg  Schifar  KGaA  S/5  I  ______I1,_________  0____  100.00%
Hamburger Ges. fiOr  Beated.  Verw. mbH  52  1  005%  4.00  ___I
Verainigte  industrieunternohmnen  AG  L.7  S  . I____  ____  ____  ____  ______  100,00%  ____
sayernwerk  AG  /I  J54  38.84%  _____  j  ____61,16%  I____ 
Ruhfgas  AG  74  _55  36,31%  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _1_  _  _  _  _  _  _  ____
D~eutsche  Babcock  Au  65  Is6  I_____{_____  ____I_____  I  100,00%  ____
Undo AG  iJ.00 57L  32.00%  _  _  _  __  _  _  6,0
K(loeckner-Werke AG  Ss.A..  58__a__~  19,60%.  ,  ___40_____44%
Scherina  AG  -~~~1  8  . . 9  100,00%
source:  Monopalkommjession  (351Table 1lb: 1988 Ownership of the largest 100 firma
1  i  ~Ownersi  I_  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _
Name  ~~~~Rantk  I Rank I 100  biggest I  Banks  I  Foreign  iPublic  Individuals iSmall  Other
1972119881  Comeanies I& insurancel  Ownens  Sector  & Families  i  Investors i  Investors
Hattie Warani-  und Kaufhaus GmbH  /  I  e0  I  0,0 
Westdatutache Landesbankc  Girozantrale  el6  I____  66,60%  1  1  33,40%
Enka  AG  /  62  I  97L,20%  j  1 _2,80%
Compagnie  de Saint-Gobain  !/  63I  1.I...  24
Saarstahl  V8lkling.n  GmbN  ~  j  64  _____  i____  24.00%  76,00%  1  ____1  ___  ____
C&A  Branninkmeyer  47  65  1  _________I  100,00%  I_________
AskcDetscheA  K  6  4u0%h6,9%  __AG_  es_____T  55.00%  45,00%
HAchkoe  DetchG  uhu  AG41  .67  4,0  1  r  T0  '3;7,2%  > 1,9%
Axel Sprnger  Voilag AG  88  6AL  1  1  __  50,10%  39,90%  10,00%
Bosch-Siemens  Hausceraets  GmbH  T  8  69  100,00%_____11
Rheinmetail Berli  AG  I/  70  I  _____  ____  32.00%  33,30%  34,70%
Kloecknerl'Humboldt Datz  AG  44  I  71  _____<51,48%  >  >24,88  < 23,64%  ___
NestI6  Deutichland  AG  I/  72  __________97,60%  _____2,40%  ____
Wackcer-Chemtie  GmbH  11173  1  50,00%  so___  ____  000%  ___
Freudenberg  & Co.  I  /  ______1  74___  ____  _____I100.00%  _  _  _  ____
Philipp  Holzmenn  AG  52  75  20,00%  ____43_  39____57____
Berliner KCraft- und Ucht AG  [..L  76~  20,00%  ______  _____  0%  ______29,20%  ___
Volksft0rsorge  Ot.  Labensvers.  AG  I  771  3001%  50%I  ____  44,98%
OG Bank  Ot.  Gnensoanschaftsbank  /  78  _________  0,50%  I  - ~  99,50%
C.H.  Boehringer  Sohn,  ingelheim  I  79  1  __________  ____  100.00%  I____  ____
Otto  Versand  L  3  80  I  __________  ____4  65.00%  _  ___  35.00%
Bank fOr Gemeunwirtschaft AG  /81  50.01%  0,50  i  ___  ____  ___  49,49%
Victoria  Lebenaversicherungs  AG  I/82'  100.00%  I___
Rlughafen  Frankfurt  Main  AG  1  83  1  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  100,00%  I_____  _____  ____
Diehl  GmbH  & Co.  /i  84  T_ _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  __1100,00%  1 _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Eschweiler Bergwerkseverein  AG  I  r  85s  96,50%  ____1  ___  3,50%  ____
Biehtinger  Mannheim  GmnbH  I  /  as  ___  ____  __  7Vioo.oo%____
NUch8linR__f_nw_k1  KGa___/  8  100,00%.  I___
Grundia AG  .79  88  7.10%  j  ____  24.50%  ____  68,40%  ___
Beiersdort  AG  jI  89  _____j31,20%  1,  > 25%  I  -20%  __
PWA Papierwerke Weldhof-Asch.  AG  go  ~2.  ____  I  2500%  10.00%  ,[615,00%  ____
E.  Merck  I/  91  ____  j100,00%  I________
B~ergmann  Elaktrncititswewke AG  I  92  37%0  6  1.9%,  I  ________  ____  1.10%.  ___
Miele  & Cie.  GmbH4 & Co.  I  /  93  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _Ii  100.00%  I_  _  __  _  _  _
Sayen.sche  Landasbank Girozentrals  94  I  0,00%  .50,00%
SKF  GmbH  /  95  _____  ____99.90%  '.____  0.10%
Alusuesse  Deutachland  GmbH  I  96  1  __________100,00%  I____
Strabag  Sau-AG  I76  97  ____  ___  > 25%  <75%  ____
VDO  Adolf  Schindling  AG  I  18  ______  I___  73,70%  I  26.30%  _____
Energie-Versorgung  Schwaben AG  I  9  ____  .- 100,00%  _________
Aechnenr und MUnchnar Beteil. AG  /  I  100  I  X___I_____1.,00%  i80.00%  ____ I*Maionty  stake in Messarschmidt-Boelkow-81ohm GmbH sold to Daimler-Benz AG in  19___9_
Bargmiann  shares sold completely (98.9%)  to non-bank as of  1/1  /89  99I____
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